

Wang Ming

LENIN,
LENINISM
AND
THE CHINESE
REVOLUTION

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The great army of world communism and all progressive and peace-loving mankind are celebrating the centenary of the birth of great Lenin. The Chinese Communists and the Chinese people, who are in a tragic situation and live in an atmosphere of terror, wholeheartedly and in every possible way take part in all world events connected with the celebration of this historical date—the centenary of the birth of the great man. In so doing they regard great Lenin as their favourite leader and teacher; they consider all-conquering Leninism as their only ideology and banner and the Leninist CPSU and the glorious Soviet people as their dear elder brothers, their true and reliable friends.

Lenin, a brilliant thinker, great revolutionary and loyal continuer of the cause of Marx and Engels, had always regarded the Chinese people with a feeling of internationalist sympathy. Even at the time when the revolutionary-democratic programme of Sun Yat-sen was made public and at the time of the 1911-12 revolution in China Lenin pointed out that the great Chinese people is "capable not only of lamenting its age-long sla-

very and dreaming of liberty and equality, but of fighting the age-long oppressors of China."¹

At the same time Lenin foresaw that the alliance of the Chinese peasantry with the liberal bourgeoisie would be disastrous for the former and that betrayal by the liberal bourgeoisie of the cause of the revolution was inevitable. He wrote about this in his article *Regenerated China*: "China's freedom was won by an alliance of peasant democrats and the liberal bourgeoisie. Whether the peasants, who are not led by a proletarian party, will be able to retain their democratic positions against the liberals, who are only waiting for an opportunity to shift to the right, will be seen in the near future."²

Lenin also foresaw that a proletarian party would inevitably be organized that would lead the peasantry and direct the Chinese revolution. In his article *Democracy and Narodism in China* Lenin wrote with great insight: "...The Chinese proletariat will increase as the number of Shanghais increases. It will probably form some kind of Chinese Social-Democratic labour party which, while criticizing the petty-bourgeois utopias and reactionary views of Sun Yat-sen, will certainly take care to single out, defend and develop the revolutionary-democratic core of his political and agrarian programme."³ Thus it is clear that Lenin regarded an alliance between the peasantry and the proletariat—under the leadership of the pro-

letariat represented by its Marxist party—as the main force of the Chinese revolution and the chief guarantee of its victory.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution Lenin, as head of government of the world's first socialist state, immediately stretched out a hand to the much-suffering Chinese people. He declared all unequal treaties concluded by the tsarist government with China annulled and the return to China of all Russian concessions and military indemnities. He sent a plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR to China thereby recognizing the Chinese Republic, whereas the western imperialist powers at the time only sent envoys to China, since they regarded China as a semi-colony, a second-class state.

Thus Lenin laid the foundations of friendship between the two great nations. However, his concern for the Chinese people was not limited to this. As a great Marxist-internationalist Lenin realized more clearly than anybody else that for the liberation of the Chinese people from the oppression of foreign imperialists and local feudal militarists and for the inclusion of China in the mainstream of the world process of socialist revolutions, i.e., for ensuring a non-capitalist path of development in China, it was necessary, first and foremost, to render the Chinese working people all possible assistance in organizing its Marxist, Bolshevik, Communist party. Thus Lenin, after the formation of the Communist International which he headed, sent Comintern representatives to China more than once to establish contact both with its advanced intellectuals, whose chief

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 18, p. 164.

² *Ibid.*, p. 401.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

spokesman was the well-known Professor Li Tao-Chao, and with its advanced workers, in order to pass on to them the theory and tactics of Marxism and Bolshevism, the experience of the Russian revolution.

As a result, there appeared in 1920 the first communist groups in Peking, Shanghai, Hupei, Shantung, Hunan, Kwangchou and other Chinese cities. The First Congress of the CPC was convened in Shanghai in July 1921 on the initiative of Lenin and thanks to the great efforts and direct participation of a Comintern representative sent by him. The Congress was held despite opposition by Chen Tu-hsiu who, together with some others, considered the formation of the CPC to be immature and did not take part in the Congress.

Thus Lenin actually initiated the creation of the Communist Party of China.

The Second Congress of the CPC (1922) adopted a decision on the entry of the Communist Party of China into the Comintern. At its Fourth Congress the Comintern, by a formal decision, accepted the CPC as its Chinese section. Thus the CPC became a component part of the world communist movement under the ideological, political and organizational leadership of the Leninist Comintern.

It was Lenin who personally laid the theoretical and tactical foundations of the Communist Party of China and of the Chinese revolution.

The Leninist Comintern sent the Second Congress of the CPC a directive saying that the anti-imperialist national-revolutionary struggle in se-

mi-colonial China was of great significance and that the CPC should take a most active part in this struggle in order to secure the leading role of the proletariat in it.

To develop the anti-imperialist and anti-militarist revolutionary movement Lenin helped the young Communist Party of China create a single anti-imperialist national front which included Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang, and turn the Kuomintang into a revolutionary bloc comprising the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. Thus the Kuomintang came to include a new and truly consistent revolutionary force made up of Communists and was able to revive its revolutionary activity. As for the Communist Party of China, it had in the Kuomintang an ally which more or less represented the masses and acquired through the alliance a certain territorial base for developing a legal, mass-scale revolutionary movement.

It was the anti-imperialist, national, united front, set up with Lenin's assistance, consisting of the Kuomintang headed by the great revolutionary-democrat Sun Yat-sen and the Communist Party of China that was the political basis of the great 1925-27 Chinese revolution.

In its directive to the Third Congress of the CPC (1923) the Leninist Comintern pointed out the urgent need to involve the peasant masses in the Chinese revolution and recommended that the CPC exert every effort to develop the peasant movement and secure the leading role of the proletariat in it. The directive noted: "The peasant question becomes the central question of all polit-

ics. To avoid this main issue under whatever pretext is to fail to understand the entire significance of the social and economic basis of China, for this is the only basis on which it is possible to wage a victorious struggle against imperialism and consistently to eliminate feudal survivals in China."

It is thus clear that in Lenin's view the most important strategic and tactical prerequisites for the CPC in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China consisted in creating a single anti-imperialist national-liberation front, in developing the anti-feudal peasant agrarian revolution and in securing proletarian hegemony in these revolutionary movements.

The hegemony of the proletariat in the anti-imperialist and agrarian revolution, as taught by Lenin, was the main internal condition for and guarantee of not only the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution but its conversion into a socialist revolution. The Soviet Union's comprehensive assistance to the Chinese revolution and the experience of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in revolution and socialist construction which the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people drew on were the main external conditions for and guarantee of the victory of the Chinese revolution through all the stages of its development and socialist construction in China.

After Lenin's death the Leninist Comintern and the Central Committee of Lenin's Party, the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, further developed Lenin's teaching on the national-liberation revolutions of the colonial and semi-

colonial peoples in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions in general and the Chinese revolution in particular, thus rendering the Communist Party of China invaluable assistance in matters of theory and tactics.

The Chinese Communists and the Chinese people have for decades been waging a heroic and selfless fight for the triumph of Leninism in China, for the victory of Leninist theory and tactics in their national and social liberation struggle. Fighting in exceptionally hard underground conditions, in the grim circumstances that accompany revolutionary and national-liberation wars, hundreds of thousands of Chinese Communists and YCLers, together with millions of revolutionary workers, peasants, intellectuals and students, with Lenin's name in their hearts, and under the banner of Leninism exerted every effort, many giving their lives for achieving victory over the internal exploiters and oppressors and international imperialism.

At the same time the Chinese Communists, with Leninist internationalists in the front ranks fought—and are fighting today—under the banner of Leninism a bitter, complex and selfless struggle against anti-Leninist, nationalist, "left" and right opportunist, bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements, defending Marxism in the interests of the revolution.

Under the guidance of the Comintern and aided by the CPSU, the Communist Party of China headed by Leninist internationalists overcame the right-opportunist defeatist line of Chen Tu-hsiu and the Trotskyite-Chen Tu-hsiu liquidator

groups in the 20's, the "left" opportunist, adventurist semi-Trotskyite line of Li Li-san and the Trotskyite-Chen Tu-hsiu, counter-revolutionary group of Lo Chang-ling in the 30's.

But the most difficult, complex and protracted struggle by the Communists, Leninist internationalists has been that against the anti-Leninist, anti-socialist, pan-Chinese-nationalist and bourgeois careerist ideas and activity of Mao Tse-tung.

Back in July 1923 Mao Tse-tung wrote an article entitled *The Coup in Peking and Traders*, published in the magazine *Hsiangtao* (organ of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, No. 31/32), in which he praised the Chinese bourgeoisie as the basic and guiding force in the Chinese revolution. He wrote: "This revolution is a task for the entire people. The entire people of the country—traders, workers, peasants, students, teachers and office employees—all must carry out a part of the revolutionary work. Yet, because of historical necessity and the demands of the current situation, the work to be undertaken by traders is most urgent and important compared to the work to be done by the rest of the citizens." Mao continued: "The greater the cohesion among the traders, the greater their influence, the stronger is the force acting as the leader of the entire country, the sooner will the revolution triumph!" (It was because of the similarity of his ideas with the right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu that Mao Tse-tung was elected member of the Central Committee at the Third Congress of the Communist Party of China on the proposal of Chen Tu-hsiu.)

In his article *Report on a Survey of the Peasant Movement in Hunan Province* (*Hsientsien Pinglung* magazine, No. 3, 1927) Mao Tse-tung had high praise for peasants' spontaneity but made no mention of the fact that the peasant movement had been organized by the local bodies of the Communist Party of China, or of the need for establishing unity between the peasantry and the proletariat with the proletariat assuming the guiding role. What is more, Mao said nothing about the need to arm workers and peasants in order to conduct an agrarian revolution under the direction of Communists. All this had been repeatedly demanded of the Communist Party of China by the Comintern. The question of who was for and who was against the Comintern's directions on these matters was a subject of serious controversy in those years within the leadership and among party cadres.

Thus Mao Tse-tung was an undisguised anti-Leninist and a follower of Chen Tu-hsiu on the basic questions of theory and tactics in the first period of the Chinese revolution when an anti-imperialist united national front was being formed and an agrarian revolution was being launched. But since he did not occupy a leading post in the Party at that time his utterances were regarded as a mere echo of Chen Tu-hsiu's opportunism, which was being severely criticized by the Party. Mao Tse-tung's positions were also rejected, but Mao failed to learn a lesson and correct his erroneous views.

In the second period of the Chinese revolution, the period of agrarian revolution and preparation

for setting up an anti-Japanese, united national front (in 1930), when the "left" adventurist Li Li-san's line took the upper hand in the CPC leadership, Mao Tse-tung became its ardent supporter and twice made Red Army troops, despite unfavourable conditions, storm the big provincial town of Changsha. (It was because of this that Mao Tse-tung, on the proposal of Li Li-san was elected member of the Central Committee Political Bureau at the 3rd plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee). The Party overcame Li Li-san's putschist line and criticized Mao Tse-tung's mistakes. But he again failed to correct views.

In 1931 Mao Tse-tung began to propagandize his theory to the effect that "the present Soviet movement in China is a purely peasant movement," from which followed his assertion that there was no possibility for the Chinese revolution to develop along the non-capitalist path but that there existed the possibility of the development of "peasant capitalism."

I criticized this theory of Mao's in early 1932 in the book *For Further Bolshevization of the Chinese Communist Party*, though Mao Tse-tung's name was not mentioned there (see the above-mentioned book put out in Chinese by the Publishing Association of Foreign Workers in the USSR (2nd edition), Moscow, 1934, pp. 125-132, or *Chichfang she* edition, Yanan, 1940, pp. 108-115).

Overestimation of the role of the bourgeoisie in the Chinese revolution, underestimation of the revolutionary role of the proletariat and rejection

of the proletariat as the hegemonic class in the Chinese revolution, placing the peasantry above the working class and denial of the need for union of the proletariat and the peasantry with the proletariat assuming the leading role, rejection of the possibility of the Chinese revolution developing along a non-capitalist, i.e., socialist road—all these are the sources as well as component parts of the anti-Leninist, anti-socialist ideological concepts of Mao Tse-tung.

In his work *On New Democratism*, which Mao Tse-tung himself called his "first fundamental theoretical work," he revised all basic theoretical and tactical Leninist theses with regard to the Chinese revolution. He continued to maintain that there existed in China no possibility of launching a socialist revolution and establishing a socialist state with a socialist policy, economy and culture but that there it was possible to carry out a "new democratic" revolution and set up under the guidance of the bourgeoisie "or" proletariat a "new democratic republic," i.e., bourgeois-democratic republic with a new democratic policy, economy and culture. This Mao's work is merely a continuation and further development of his anti-Leninist, anti-socialist ideological concepts combined with Trotskyism and Chen Tu-hsiuism which took shape in the 20's-30's (see his booklet *On New Democratism* published in Chinese by *Tsehfang she*, Yanan, 1944 or Mao Tse-tungs' one-volume selected works in Chinese published by *Tungpei shutien*, 1948, pp. 233-273).

In his report and concluding speech at the 2nd plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee

(7th convocation) held in March 1949, Mao Tse-tung declared that it was impossible to carry out socialist revolution and socialist construction after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution (the full text of the report and the concluding speech have not yet been published; the so-called Mao Tse-tung's report at the above-mentioned 2nd plenum published twice in the 60's is falsified). In his article *On Democratic Dictatorship of the People* (1949) Mao Tse-tung said that it was impossible to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat but that it was only possible to establish a "democratic dictatorship of the people" as a "combined dictatorship of the working class, the peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie." His pronouncements after the failure of the "big leap" and the "people's communes" on the impossibility of building socialism in China for decades and even centuries, his "fatherly concern and solicitude" for the Chinese national bourgeoisie—all this is further development and concrete application by Mao Tse-tung of his anti-Leninist, anti-socialist "new democratism", i.e., "Mao Tse-tungism," as he himself called it after the notorious "style-streamlining campaign" in the 40's.

It follows that Mao Tse-tung's neo-democratism, or Mao Tse-tungism, is in essence nothing but the theory and programme of the Chinese national bourgeoisie as opposed to the theory and programme of the Chinese working class in the Chinese revolution.

It is these anti-Leninist and anti-socialist ideological concepts, together with those notions which

Mao Tse-tung drew from feudal monarchy, anarchism, Trotskyism and militarism that are the basic ideological and theoretical causes of his political downfall. They have manifested themselves throughout the years beginning from the time when Mao Tse-tung waged a perfidious struggle against Lenin and Leninism, the Comintern and the world communist and workers' movement, the CPSU and the Soviet Union, the Communist Party and working people of China, to the time when he openly betrayed Marxism-Leninism and displayed attitudes of rabid anti-communism and insolent anti-Sovietism, and showed vehement hatred for the Chinese people and the entire progressive and peace-loving mankind.

Taking advantage of certain internal and international factors and staging numerous conspiracies and intrigues, Mao Tse-tung managed to seize political power in the Party after the enlarged session of the Politbureau of the CC CPC held in Tsuni at the beginning of 1935. Between the 6th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the 6th convocation (October-November 1938) and the Seventh Congress of the CPC (April-May 1945) Mao not only usurped the supreme power in the Party but also established a sort of personal military dictatorship in it. Consequently the struggle against his ideas and activities in the Party became increasingly difficult. At various stages of the Chinese revolution Chinese Communists, true to Leninism and the principle of proletarian internationalism, fought tirelessly and selflessly against Mao Tse-tung's anti-Leninist, anti-socialist and anti-popular ideas and poli-

cies, for the victory of a Leninist policy. It may be stated that historic successes were achieved in this struggle.

The third period of the Chinese revolution was marked by the setting up of a united national anti-Japanese front which was to mobilize the people of China for armed resistance to Japanese aggressors, and lay the ground for victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. At that time Mao Tse-tung was opposed to the policy of a united anti-Japanese front; he called for the creation of an "anti-Chiang Kai-shek front in alliance with Japan and Wang Ching-wei," which Mao himself termed a "policy of national treason," and whose aim was to provoke Japanese imperialism to unleash war against the Soviet Union. Mao's suggestion was completely defeated, and the policy of establishing an anti-Japanese national front and waging a national-revolutionary war against Japanese aggression in close alliance with the Soviet Union triumphed. The Soviet Union's entry into the war with Japan in accordance with its allied commitments and the Soviet Army's rout of the picked Kwantung Army of Japan were a decisive contribution to the Chinese people's liberation from brutal Japanese occupation; furthermore, they created favourable conditions for the Communist Party and the people of China to achieve victory in the coming revolutionary war against the counter-revolutionary forces headed by Chiang Kai-shek and backed by US imperialists.

In the fourth period of the Chinese revolution—that of the victory of the bourgeois-democratic

revolution and its development into a socialist revolution—Mao Tse-tung was defeated in his call for the forming of a coalition government which would include the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other parties and groups after the victory over the Japanese aggressors. This political line was based on his idea that "cooperation in war determines cooperation after war" (stated in his report *On a Coalition Government* delivered at the Seventh CPC Congress in April 1945).

Subsequent events confirmed the correctness of the policy based on the proposition that "contradictions during the war are different from those after the war, and therefore cooperation in war does not mean that there must be cooperation after war." That was a policy aimed at preparing the Party and people for a new revolutionary civil war against the US-backed anti-national, anti-popular and counter-revolutionary Chiang Kai-shek regime, for completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution and promoting its development into a socialist revolution (outlined in my report *On the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party* delivered at the general meeting of Party cadres, convened by the Party Committee at the CC CPC on December 25, 1945).

Led by the Communist Party and supported by the people of China, the heroic national-liberation army of China defeated the multi-million-strong army of Chiang Kai-shek, Li Tsung-jen, Yan Hsi-shang and other militarists, which the United States had armed with modern military equipment. The national-liberation army was able

to score that victory, firstly, because the Soviet Union's victory over Hitlerite Germany and militarist Japan in the Second World War had created an extremely favourable situation inside the country, and secondly, because the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government had rendered China tremendous military and technical assistance, supplying it with modern armaments which the heroic Soviet Army seized from the million-strong Kwantung Army of Japan in August 1945, and placing at its disposal Northeast China, an economically and industrially advanced area. But for this all-round, selfless, internationalist assistance on the part of the mighty Soviet Union, the Chinese revolution would not have succeeded in 1949.

In the fifth period of the Chinese revolution—that of socialist revolution and socialist construction—Mao Tse-tung followed a policy which he outlined in his report to the 2nd plenum of the CC CPC of the 7th convocation in March 1949, in which he asserted that it was impossible to carry out socialist revolution and socialist construction in China after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution because of the existence of imperialism, the incompleteness of the agrarian revolution, the inadequate development of capitalism in China and the participation of national bourgeoisie in the revolution. Although that policy triumphed and for four years was adhered to in Party and state affairs, it was ultimately overcome by a Leninist, Comintern policy. Such a policy was indeed desired by the whole Communist Party and the people of China; the

policy confirms the possibility for China to take a non-capitalist path of development and the possibility of the transformation of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution due to its anti-imperialist nature, the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution and the assistance of the Soviet Union.

That policy, which is outlined chiefly in my work *The Soviets in China as a Special Form of Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry* (magazine *Communist International*, No. 31, 1934, pp. 22-33), and which was approved at the time by the Comintern leadership and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a policy which I defended and which Mao Tse-tung opposed at the above-mentioned 2nd plenum of the Central Committee, triumphed first at the 4th plenum of the CC CPC of the 7th convocation in January 1954, then at the All-China Party Conference in March of the same year, and finally at the Eighth CPC Congress in October 1956.

The defeat of the right-opportunist, and plainly Trotskyite-Chen Tu-hsiungist policy of surrender advocated by Mao Tse-tung on the basic issues of the Chinese revolution made the “ideas of Mao Tse-tung” synonymous with Trotskyism and Chen Tu-hsiungism in the eyes of the Party and people. That is why Mao Tse-tung was compelled to accept not only the Party policy of socialist revolution and socialist construction but also the proposals concerning introduction of changes in the contents of the “Main Principles” of the CPC Rules adopted by the Seventh Con-

gress. Instead of accepting "the ideas of Mao Tse-tung as guidance for all activities" of the CPC, the new Rules adopted at the 8th Congress stipulated that "the Communist Party of China is guided in its activities by Marxism-Leninism." That was really a great victory over anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist Maoism.

The CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet Government and the Soviet people rendered the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Government and people tremendous economic, scientific-technological and cultural-educational assistance for socialist construction in China. As a result, an industrial base was built in China within a short period of time, which ensured the further all-round development of the national economy. But for the adventurist "big leap" and "people's communes," but for the unbridled slanderous campaign against the Soviet Union which made its further assistance to China impossible, but for the so-called "cultural revolution," the situation in China today would be entirely different. With the Soviet Union's all-round and selfless assistance, in close and mutually advantageous cooperation with the world socialist community, in the conditions of the modern-day scientific and technical revolution, and as a result of the creative endeavour of millions of workers, peasants and intellectuals, the People's Republic of China could have been by now a flourishing socialist industrial power with an advanced agriculture, science and culture. The Chinese people could have been living and working in secure, cultured and peaceful conditions; they would not

have been doomed to constant intimidation from Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao with their shameless, insolent and inhuman slogans, such as "do not fear poverty," "do not fear privation," "do not fear death," "prepare for war," "prepare for hunger," etc.

Thus historical events have clearly proved that during the three stages of the Chinese revolution (anti-imperialist national-liberation revolution, anti-feudal bourgeois democratic revolution, anti-capitalist socialist revolution) Mao Tse-tung committed either "left" or right, or combined "left" and right revisionist and opportunist mistakes, and that ultimately it was the Leninist theory, Leninist tactics and the Leninist policy that triumphed. But this does not mean that by first usurping military, then party and then state power, Mao Tse-tung had not at different times done great harm to the cause of the Chinese revolution and the international communist, working-class and national-liberation movement. On the contrary, facts irrefutably show that whenever Mao Tse-tung took the upper hand in military, party and state affairs he invariably inflicted—and still inflicts—serious damage to our common cause both inside and outside China.

For example, after the conference in Tsuni Mao Tse-tung by his adventurist, schismatic and harmful policy reduced the 270-thousand-strong Chinese Red Army to 45,000 thus causing great damage to the cause of the Communist Party and the people of China.

In the first half of the 1940s, under the pretext

of the so-called "campaign to rectify the style of Party work," Mao did immense ideological, political and organizational harm to the Communist Party of China by destroying and torturing tens of thousands of Party workers and revolutionary youth organizations. It has become obvious today that the anti-communist, treacherous campaign was a dress-rehearsal of the "cultural revolution."

By pursuing his "three red banners" policy in the late '50s and early '60s Mao brought the cause of socialist construction in China and her economy to the brink of disaster, and the living conditions of the Chinese people—to unbelievably low standards, to destitution. He thereby discredited the ideas of socialism in the eyes of the world public.

By his anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet, schismatic and subversive activity he has, since the early '60s, done great harm to the world socialist community, the world communist and labour movement and the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, particularly to the national-liberation struggle of the Vietnamese and Arab peoples. He thereby renders the US and other imperialists a great service while ignoring the vital interests of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people.

And what unbelievable calamities, what misfortunes, unprecedented in Chinese history, he has brought to the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people; what great harm and damage he is causing to the socialist countries,

the Communist and Workers' Parties and the just cause of all peoples fighting against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, for freedom, progress and peace, by his crimes in the course of the "cultural revolution" in China!

It is not surprising that today "the thought of Mao Tse-tung," as well as Mao personally, have become to the Chinese people and working people throughout the world a symbol of errors and untruth, a symbol of calamities and misfortunes, a symbol of barbarism and savagery, a symbol of obscurantism and counter-revolution.

In order to impose his mad ideas and policy on the people of China and other countries, to preserve his reactionary, despotic military regime, and to enable his successors to inherit his imperial throne, he has for a number of years concentrated his attention and effort on two principal tasks: first, to brainwash the Chinese Communists and people so as to replace the ideas of Leninism with Maoism; second, to brainwash the Chinese Communists and people so as to neutralize the influence of the CPSU and the Soviet state and destroy the feelings of friendship cherished by the Chinese people for the Communists and peoples of the USSR by promoting anti-Sovietism and anti-communism.

To achieve his ends Mao Tse-tung has for decades launched one campaign after another and used either bloody or "peaceful" terrorist and deceitful methods and policies against the Chinese Communists and people. However, life itself shows that he has never been able, nor will he be able, to achieve his aims fully. The

chief evidence of this is the "cultural revolution" which is actually nothing but a counter-revolutionary coup against the Communist Party and people of China, as well as against the Soviet Union and the world communist movement. The campaign is being conducted under such slogans as: "The thought of Mao Tse-tung is in danger"; "The thought of Mao Tse-tung is being prevented from spreading among the present generation"; "Modern revisionism (the reference is to Leninism) must be uprooted"; "Soviet agents must be eliminated" (that is, advocates of proletarian internationalism).

Another evidence of Mao's failure to achieve his aims fully is the following fact. Although in the initial period of the "cultural revolution" Mao Tse-tung and his group succeeded in defeating the Communist Party, the Young Communist League and the trade unions of China and in persecuting and destroying physically millions upon millions of Communists and YCLers, workers, peasants, intellectuals, for their loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and for their internationalist feelings towards the Soviet Union; although the Maoists have brought the anti-Soviet psychosis to a point where armed provocations on the Soviet border were staged, they continue to complain that neither after a second nor third, fourth, fifth, etc. "cultural revolution" will they be able to attain their ends for decades or even centuries to come. This is borne out by the decisions of the 9th CPC Congress and the activity of Mao Tse-tung and his group after the Congress.

In the first place, while continuing the "cultur-

al revolution" under the slogans of "struggle," "criticism" and "re-education," of "fighting revisionism," "fighting Soviet spies," and "fighting the class enemy," they resort to mass repressions and killings of Communists, YCLers, and ordinary working people under the pretext of fighting "criminal elements." They not only carry out purges in every enterprise, in every office, in every people's communc, in every educational establishment and in every family in an attempt to track down, hound and annihilate Communists, YCLers, advanced workers, peasants, intellectuals and students, they are also persecuting hungweipings and tsaofans, purging revolutionary committees, and the command personnel of the National-Liberation Army of China. It is no secret, of course that the hungweipings, the tsaofans, and Army units are the three mainstays of the Mao regime.

In the second place, Mao and his group are turning their anti-Soviet campaign, not only in propaganda but in their entire state and public work, into frenzied preparation for war against the Soviet Union. This shows beyond any doubt that Mao's anti-Sovietism is nationalist in form and anti-communist in content.

But Mao Tse-tung and his group shall never attain their aims. The Chinese Communists and people are firmly convinced, both in theory and practice, that Leninism is their combat banner in the struggle against, and victory over, all internal and external enemies, that it is their combat banner in the building of socialism and communism. Alliance and friendship with the So-

viet Communists and people are a necessary condition for and a reliable guarantee of victory over all enemies in the struggle for a free and happy life.

Therefore it was with a feeling of profound satisfaction that the Chinese Communists and people learned about the statement made by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held in June 1969 in Moscow. Comrade Brezhnev said then:

"We are conscious of the fact that the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples coincide. We have always done and will continue to do everything possible to keep alive the friendly feelings which the Soviet people have for the fraternal Chinese people, and we are certain that the Chinese people, too, have the same feelings towards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries."

The Chinese Communists and people regard this just and responsible statement by L. I. Brezhnev as an expression of sincere friendship not only on the part of the Soviet Communists and people, but of the Chinese Communists and people as well.

They are confident that the tragedy and misfortune caused by the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung, by his activity are a temporary, transient phenomenon, as well as Mao himself and his "thought."

They are confident that the defeat of Mao Tse-tung is inevitable just as the defeat of any

traitor to revolution and to Marxism-Leninism is an implicable law of history.

They are confident that the time is not far off when Leninism and the cause of socialism will again triumph on Chinese soil.

They are confident that the time is not far off when friendship, concord and cooperation between the Soviet Union and socialist China will triumph.

They are convinced that the time is not far off when the Chinese Communists and people will again march shoulder to shoulder with the Communists and peoples of all countries in their just, revolutionary struggle for the triumph of the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism throughout the world!

April 18, 1970